Although challenges for New Delhi could arise in the form of trade and immigration policies that previously affected the Indian tech workforce, bilateral ties can be expected to consolidate existing frameworks while focusing on new avenues for expansion.

By Pratnashree Basu

While US president-elect Donald Trump’s brand of politics is often described as unpredictable, transactional and even abrasive, India is likely to be hopeful but realistic about relations with the United States for the next four years. The expansion of bilateral ties — which have accelerated in the last decade — looks likely given that the relationship enjoys bipartisan support in the United States and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shares a close rapport with Trump. Trump’s approach towards India will likely retain core elements from his first term, with adjustments to address shifting global dynamics.

India views Trump’s emphasis on countering China as a significant convergence point. Trump’s first term shifted US focus from the ‘Asia Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’, expanding strategic engagement to include India as a vital counterweight to China’s influence. Trump established foundational changes in US defence and security organisation, including renaming the US Pacific Command to the US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018.

His administration also created structural changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defence to group Indo-Pacific allies and partners into focused units, separating them from China-related concerns. A stronger US security posture is on the cards in Trump 2.0, indicating a renewed push for strengthening bilateral defence and security ties with ‘like-minded’ countries. India is among the key partners in this effort and an important foothold for advancing the shared vision of a rules-based Indo-Pacific.

Trump’s preference for bilateral ties over multilateral and institutional frameworks could limit deeper institutional ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington’s involvement in the region through groupings — such as the Quad or the newly formed ‘Squad’ — is likely to expand, both are intentionally loose platforms without any institutional foundation.

‘Like-Minded’ Countries

While he may deprioritise institutional commitments to organisations such as ASEAN, Trump’s policies could strengthen India’s leadership role as a natural partner for the United States in countering China. This is primarily because, for Trump, the three other Quad countries are vital strategic anchors across the Atlantic.

Given that the role of ‘like-minded’ countries assumes greater importance for the United States with each passing year, Trump 2.0 will continue building on his earlier role in reinforcing security alliances, such as extending the US–Japan security treaty to include the Senkaku Islands, advancing US troop rotations in Australia and bringing the Philippines back into the US alliance network.

India has become central to US defence and strategic thinking in the Indo-Pacific. During Trump’s first term, defence ties deepened with the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation. Though these agreements were already in the pipeline when Trump first assumed office, their finalisation during his term facilitated enhanced military collaboration and intelligence sharing, particularly in defence technology and critical sectors such as space and cyber-security.

During Trump’s first term, under the ‘America First’ doctrine, the United States continued its policy of arms sales to India. The Trump 2.0 administration could reinforce these gains, helping India enhance its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and its ability to counter China’s maritime assertiveness. Existing initiatives, such as the United States–India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies, would align well with Trump’s emphasis on ensuring technological superiority.

inclusive Indo-Pacific Vision

With its geographic position in the Indian Ocean and growing military and economic capabilities, India plays a pivotal role in US efforts to ensure freedom of navigation, safeguard critical sea lanes and promote regional connectivity initiatives. Trump’s previous administration was instrumental in revitalising the Quad partnership, promoting it as a mechanism to address Chinese assertiveness across strategic and economic domains.

At the same time, India also advocates for an inclusive Indo-Pacific approach that is not solely predicated on the containment of China. While Trump may favour a more confrontational stance, India, along with countries like Japan and Australia have consistently supported an inclusive Indo-Pacific vision that goes beyond a singular focus on containing China.

While the United States may pressure India to assume a larger security role in the Indian Ocean, which aligns with India’s ambitions, India will navigate cautiously if its policy of strategic autonomy risks overextension. Trump’s tendency to view alliances through a cost-benefit lens might lead to heightened expectations for India to share more of the regional security burden.

India is likely to seek to leverage US support to strengthen its Indo-Pacific role while maintaining flexibility to safeguard its strategic partnerships with other powers, including Russia. India would also push for continuity in Quad initiatives, defence modernisation and technology cooperation while resisting excessive demands for alignment that could limit its autonomy.

Trade Barriers

During Trump’s first term, US–India trade relations faced challenges including tariffs, the revocation of India’s ‘Generalised System of Preferences’ status and pressure from the United States on India to reduce trade barriers and enforce intellectual property protections, while his restrictive immigration policies significantly impacted the Indian tech workforce. Trump’s return may revive these policies, affecting trade dynamics, the Indian diaspora and IT sector ties, prompting India to focus on domestic talent development and advocate for more favourable visa terms.

Meanwhile, Trump has appointed Indian-American venture capitalist Sriram Krishnan as Senior Policy Advisor for Artificial Intelligence, positioning him in a pivotal role in shaping AI policy and immigration reform. This appointment also coincides with discussions on eliminating the country cap for H-1B visas, a move that could greatly benefit Indian skilled workers facing long green card backlogs.

In late December, on his last trip of 2024, India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, met Michael Waltz, US president-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for US National Security Advisor, who is a key advocate for India–United States relations, having co-chaired the Congressional India Caucus and actively supported many India-related legislation.

From an Indian standpoint, Trump’s 2024 win is a positive development, promising a continuation of strengthening security ties. India’s diplomatic strategy must balance economic interests with trade-offs on strategic autonomy and regional security. The Trump 2.0 administration will demand pragmatic diplomacy, leveraging India’s strategic importance while managing US demands for reciprocity.

Pratnashree Basu is Associate Fellow at the Indo-Pacific at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, India.

This piece has been sourced from the East Asia Forum of the Australian National University.