Conflict-driven extraction of rare earths and other minerals in Myanmar’s border states is spreading pollution across shared rivers, endangering health and livelihoods in Myanmar and Thailand while funding armed groups.

Mining in Myanmar’s eastern borderlands has become a transboundary crisis. What was once framed as a potential engine for development now fuels armed conflict, weakens governance, and spreads toxic pollution through shared river systems into Thailand. A recent policy paper from the Stimson Center traces how demand for critical minerals intersects with Myanmar’s protracted civil war to produce severe environmental and public health risks.

Since the 2021 military coup, extraction of rare earth elements, gold, tin, antimony and other minerals has intensified in conflict-affected areas. These activities generate revenue for ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and military-aligned militias while externalising ecological and social costs onto vulnerable communities on both sides of the border.

Conflict as the Structural Enabler of Extraction

Armed conflict is not a backdrop to mining in Myanmar the policy paper says; it is the structural condition that enables it. For decades, territorial contestation has allowed state forces, military-affiliated businesses and EAOs to control land, licensing and revenues. Formal legal frameworks exist, yet they are routinely overridden by militarised control and informal permissions issued by local commanders.

In Kachin State, one of the country’s richest mineral zones with deposits of jade, amber, gold and rare earths, the New Democratic Army-Kachin, a junta-aligned militia, colluded with Chinese interests to extract rare earths with almost no regulatory oversight from 2010 to 2024. The Kachin Independence Army seized control of the main rare-earth mining regions in the Irrawaddy basin in late 2024, paused exports briefly, then renegotiated arrangements. The Kachin Independence Organisation has since introduced regulations and collects taxes while providing security, yet Chinese economic pressure, including border closures and restrictive trade terms, continues to constrain efforts at more sustainable practices.

Shan State has seen a proliferation of gold, rare earth, tin and manganese mining under the expanding influence of the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army’s control of the Mong La area. Reports from the Shan Human Rights Foundation have raised concerns about possible forced labour in some rare-earth operations. Mobile gold-dredging boats operating along the Salween and Kok rivers further complicate oversight as they move across contested territories.

Karenni State’s long-standing tin and antimony mines around Mawchi have shifted toward more chemical-intensive processing, sending toxic runoff into Molo Creek and the Salween River. Contamination levels have been recorded at up to 55 times above safety standards. The Interim Executive Council has issued warnings and begun drafting governance frameworks, but comprehensive policies remain incomplete. Karen State, under the Karen National Union, possesses a more established Department of Mining dating to 1971 and a third iteration of its Mining Act, yet enforcement capacity remains limited by conflict and resource constraints.

Environmental Destruction on an Industrial Scale

The environmental footprint is severe. In Kachin’s jade areas, open-cut mining has flattened mountains, leaving landscapes prone to landslides. More than a decade of rare-earth extraction using in-situ leaching – injecting ammonium sulfate and other chemicals into hillsides – has caused widespread vegetation die-off and long-term soil and aquifer contamination. Similar patterns appear in gold, antimony and tin mining across Shan, Karen and Karenni states, where forest cover has been stripped and slopes destabilised, accelerating landslides and flooding during monsoons.

Satellite data show sharp deforestation in rare-earth hotspots. Between 2018 and 2024, key townships in Kachin lost tens of thousands of hectares of tree cover in areas overlapping global biodiversity hotspots. Ecosystems that once linked the Eastern Himalayas to mainland Southeast Asia are unlikely to recover on human timescales in the absence of mine closure and rehabilitation requirements.

Water Pollution as a Transboundary Crisis

Water is the most critical shared concern. Mining waste and chemical effluents are routinely discharged untreated into headwater streams. Contaminants include arsenic, mercury, cadmium, lead, radioactive elements and industrial reagents. In rare-earth operations, acidic wastewater from leaching flows into rivers, producing discoloration, turbidity, fish die-offs and foul odours.

Pollution does not stop at the border. Contaminants travel downstream through the Kok, Sai, Salween and Mekong systems into northern Thailand. Repeated testing there has found arsenic and other heavy metals exceeding international safety standards, prompting health warnings and disrupting river-based livelihoods, agriculture and fisheries. Thailand also serves as a transit hub for both critical minerals and the chemicals used in extraction, indirectly linking it to the degradation.

An August 2025 agreement between Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Myanmar’s military junta on mining pollution has proved largely unenforceable, as most mines on transboundary rivers operate in EAO-held territories.

Health Impacts and the Burden of Proof

Communities report skin rashes, respiratory illnesses and suspected cancers linked to contaminated water, air and soil. Workers often labour without adequate protective equipment. Heavy metals bioaccumulate in fish, livestock and crops, creating long-term risks that may surface years later.

Generating rigorous scientific evidence is extraordinarily difficult. Testing is expensive, technically demanding and often dangerous in conflict zones. Basic water analysis in Thailand can cost between 1,500 and 5,000 baht per sample. Cross-border collaborations with Thai research institutions have enabled some testing, yet these remain ad hoc and underfunded. Downstream communities in both countries live with daily harm while lacking the data needed to demand accountability.

Fragile Openings for Harm Reduction and Cooperation

Despite the grim picture, the Stimson paper identifies practical openings. Several EAOs have expressed interest in responsible mining practices and technical support to reduce socio-environmental impacts and disaster risks. The KIO’s 2025 rare-earth regulations, the KNU’s longstanding mining policy, and Karenni efforts to draft frameworks represent early steps, even if enforcement remains weak.

Cross-border cooperation focused on monitoring, information sharing and technical capacity could reduce harm without waiting for a comprehensive political settlement. International supply-chain accountability for critical minerals used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and electronics also offers leverage. Myanmar has become a significant source of heavy rare earths for China-centred processing after Beijing tightened domestic environmental rules, making the conflict zone a de facto sacrifice zone for the global energy transition.

The human cost is already visible in displacement, lost livelihoods and poisoned rivers. Related reporting on Myanmar’s resource conflicts, including the deadly pressures around jade mining in Hpakant, underscores how extraction and violence reinforce each other. The story is not only about one country’s internal war. It is about the credibility of regional environmental governance, the ethics of critical-mineral supply chains, and the downstream consequences that flow far beyond Myanmar’s borders.