Nearly 88 per cent of 2026 Joint Response Plan funds for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are controlled by UN agencies while local NGOs receive just 2.5 per cent, sparking demands for localisation and efficiency reforms amid shrinking donor support.

Nearly 88 per cent of the funding under the 2026 Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya humanitarian response is held by United Nations agencies, while local non-governmental organisations receive only 2.5 per cent of the funds allocated for the refugee camps. These findings were presented at a press conference titled “Where Is the Funding for the Rohingya Response Going?” organised by the Cox’s Bazar CSO-NGO Forum (CCNF) and COAST Foundation at the Cox’s Bazar Press Club on 25 August 2026.

The research underscores a persistent imbalance in the aid architecture nearly nine years after the mass exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar began in August 2017. Bangladesh currently hosts close to 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, including new arrivals fleeing renewed violence since 2024. Speakers at the event called for greater inclusion of local organisations in the response and pressed for a clear roadmap on repatriation.

Stark Disparities in Fund Allocation

According to the study highlighted at the press conference, UN agencies control the overwhelming majority of resources under the current JRP. Local NGOs, which often operate closest to the communities and with lower overheads, remain severely underfunded. Parallel analyses by COAST Foundation of recent project approvals in the camps showed international NGOs holding 63.6 per cent of funding volume despite implementing a smaller share of projects, national NGOs receiving 33.9 per cent, and local groups limited to 2.5 per cent.

This pattern contradicts commitments under the Grand Bargain, the 2016 agreement signed by major donors, UN agencies and NGOs that aimed to channel at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding as directly as possible to local and national responders. Progress on that target has been limited in the Rohingya response, where local actors frequently function as implementing partners rather than equal decision-makers with direct access to resources.

Mounting Funding Shortfalls and Rising Costs

The overall financial picture for the Rohingya response has deteriorated. The 2025 JRP appealed for USD 934.5 million but was only about 46 per cent funded by the end of the year according to Financial Tracking Service data, with significant gaps in critical sectors such as protection, education, water and sanitation, and shelter. For 2026 the appeal was scaled down to USD 710.5 million – roughly 26 per cent lower – to cover only the most essential life-saving needs for approximately 1.56 million people, including refugees and host communities. Even this reduced target faces shortfalls.

Major donors have cut contributions sharply. US funding dropped by around 72 per cent and UK support by 48 per cent in recent assessments, though the United States remains among the largest contributors. In contrast, the Government of Bangladesh increased its allocation by an extraordinary 263 per cent compared with the previous year, partly through loans, reflecting the growing fiscal burden on the host country.

Compounding the pressure is the high share of expenditure absorbed by management and soft costs. Studies indicate these can account for around 70 per cent of spending by international agencies, leaving limited resources for direct programme delivery. Local organisations argue they can deliver comparable services at far lower cost by employing local staff and sourcing local materials such as food items, clothing and construction supplies.

Calls for Systemic Reset and Local Leadership

At the Cox’s Bazar press conference and related forums, speakers demanded a fundamental reset of the response model. Key recommendations include ending direct implementation by UN agencies and international NGOs in favour of partnership approaches, directing at least 50 per cent of funding straight to local and national actors, relocating high-cost offices away from Cox’s Bazar, and establishing transparent pooled funds managed by local consortia rather than international intermediaries.

They also stressed the need for a concrete, time-bound roadmap for the safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar. Without progress on durable solutions, the camps risk becoming permanent, with mounting environmental degradation, security challenges and strain on host communities in Ukhiya and Teknaf.

Broader Implications for Humanitarian Practice

The funding imbalance has practical consequences on the ground. Reduced resources have already led to cuts in food rations, health services, education programmes and protection activities. New arrivals since 2024 face particularly acute gaps in shelter and documentation. Host communities, long promised a share of assistance, have seen their allocation under the JRP reduced in some reports, further testing social cohesion.

Advocates of localisation note that local NGOs possess deep contextual knowledge, linguistic and cultural proximity, and established community trust – assets that international agencies cannot fully replicate. Yet bureaucratic barriers, risk-averse donor policies, and capacity assumptions continue to limit their access to core funding. Capacity-strengthening investments have been uneven, and partnerships often remain hierarchical.

The Grand Bargain’s successive iterations, including the extension beyond 2023, have repeatedly highlighted localisation, quality funding and accountability to affected populations. In the Rohingya context, these principles remain largely aspirational, local civil society leaders say. Independent audits and civil society analyses have also raised questions about efficiency, unused infrastructure and the heavy focus on short-term relief at the expense of longer-term resilience and skills development.

A Protracted Crisis

As the response enters its tenth year, the combination of donor fatigue, global competing crises and structural inefficiencies leaves Bangladesh and the Rohingya population in a precarious position. Local civil society groups insist that shifting resources and decision-making power closer to the ground is not only a matter of equity but of practical necessity for cost-effective, sustainable assistance.

Greater transparency in funding flows, multi-year flexible grants, genuine co-leadership in coordination mechanisms, and measurable progress toward the 25 per cent localisation target would mark meaningful change. At the same time, political engagement with Myanmar and regional actors remains essential to create conditions for voluntary return.

The research presented in Cox’s Bazar serves as a timely reminder that without deliberate course correction, the humanitarian system risks perpetuating high-cost models that leave both refugees and host communities underserved. Local organisations stand ready to shoulder greater responsibility – if the funding architecture finally enables them to do so.