The Amnesty investigation traces how various international firms have contributed hardware, software, or support systems to Pakistan’s surveillance setup – often through complex supply chains designed to obscure direct links between supplier and user.

A sweeping new investigation by Amnesty International asserts that Pakistan’s expansive surveillance and censorship apparatus is powered by a web of foreign technology providers – spanning China, Europe, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Canada, and the United States. The report, titled “Shadows of Control,” reveals how the Pakistani government has built a sophisticated system for monitoring, filtering and intercepting citizens’ communications – all while operating largely beyond public scrutiny.

Amnesty warns that this clandestine system seriously undermines fundamental human rights – especially freedoms of expression, privacy, and access to information. “Pakistan’s mass surveillance and censorship have been made possible through the collusion of a large number of corporate actors … This is nothing short of a vast and profitable economy of oppression,” said Agnès Callamard, Secretary General at Amnesty International.

The Building Blocks of Control: WMS 2.0 and LIMS

At the core of this machinery lie two key systems: the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0) – essentially a national firewall – and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). These tools allow authorities to block or filter online content, intercept communications, trace metadata, and employ surveillance over users with little to no transparency.

WMS 2.0 can block both entire internet access and specific content deemed “unlawful” by the government. It also allows authorities to block Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or individual website. Meanwhile, LIMS is mandated by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority across telecom networks, enabling the military, intelligence agencies (including the ISI), and other state actors to tap into subscribers’ data, phone calls, text messages, and web activity.

The report notes that LIMS, in practice, lacks adequate technical or legal safeguards. As a result, it is effectively a mechanism for broad, indiscriminate surveillance. Amnesty states that “in practice … LIMS is a tool of unlawful and indiscriminate surveillance that allows the government to spy on more than four million people at any given time.”

Foreign Firms That Made It Possible

The Amnesty investigation traces how various international firms have contributed hardware, software, or support systems to Pakistan’s surveillance setup – often through complex supply chains designed to obscure direct links between supplier and user.

The original version of WMS, dubbed WMS 1.0, used technology from Sandvine (now AppLogic Networks), a Canadian company.

After Sandvine divested in 2023, the updated WMS 2.0 was enabled through technology from Geedge Networks (China), and other components sourced from Niagara Networks (U.S.) and Thales (France).

For LIMS, the German firm Utimaco supplied system architecture, while the UAE-based company Datafusion delivered a Monitoring Center (McNG) that grants access to intercepted data.

Amnesty underscores that while many of these firms operate legitimately in global markets, they have not satisfied robust human rights due diligence norms. In some cases, governments and export control regimes have failed to enforce transparency or restrictions on surveillance tech with high potential to be misused.

In its outreach to 20 companies during the investigation, Amnesty received responses only from a subset: Niagara Networks (USA), AppLogic (Canada), Utimaco (Germany), and Datafusion (UAE). Meanwhile, nine government entities – including Canada’s Trade Controls Bureau and Germany’s export control agency (BAFA) – acknowledged receipt of Amnesty’s inquiries but declined to substantively answer. The Pakistani government did not respond.

Impact on Journalists, Civil Society, and Ordinary Citizens

The report highlights how these systems chill free expression and place enormous pressure on journalism, human rights defenders, and ordinary citizens. Under constant threat of interception, individuals may self-censor or avoid discussing politically sensitive issues altogether.

One journalist interviewed by Amnesty said he believed his communications were under surveillance at all times. After publishing a story on corruption, even his WhatsApp contacts were scrutinized. “Anyone I would speak to … would come under scrutiny,” he told Amnesty. He now fears contacting family or associates lest they be targeted.

The legal framework in Pakistan offers limited protections. While laws such as the Fair Trial Act have warrant requirements on paper, they are often ignored or bypassed. Domestic courts provide little recourse, and oversight is minimal. In practice, the combination of weak laws and powerful technology is accelerating “a shrinking of civic space in the country,” Amnesty warns.

Global Responsibility and Accountability Gaps

A central message of the Amnesty report is that states and companies enabling repressive surveillance systems share responsibility for harms experienced by Pakistani citizens. “There are human rights limitations to the search for profit in markets, but these have all been ignored,” said Callamard.

Amnesty calls for a more rigorous international regime governing the export of surveillance and censorship technologies – with mandatory human rights impact assessments, stronger export controls, corporate accountability mechanisms, and transparency obligations.

The report also urges Pakistan’s government to immediately halt the use of WMS 2.0 and LIMS, suspend procurement of further surveillance equipment, publish metadata and oversight mechanisms, and allow independent, expert reviews of existing systems.

Reaction and Outlook

As of this writing, Islamabad has not publicly responded to the report. Historically, Pakistani authorities have defended surveillance measures as necessary for national security, law enforcement, and combating terrorism.

However, civil society groups in Pakistan, along with media organizations and human rights defenders, are likely to amplify pressure following exposure of international supplier involvement. The findings may also stir questions in the home countries of implicated firms, especially in Europe and North America, about corporate responsibilities and export oversight.

At a time when digital rights are becoming increasingly contested globally, Amnesty International’s report underscores a stark reality: sophisticated surveillance systems no longer require autocratic states to build them from scratch. Through private technology transfers, repressive states can outsource tyranny to companies operating in distant jurisdictions – and in doing so, mask accountability.

Until export controls, corporate due diligence norms, and human rights safeguards catch up, many more states may follow in Pakistan’s footsteps, exposing citizens to surveillance regimes that operate entirely in the shadows.