An anti-Imran Khan coalition government of doubtful legitimacy faces allegations of violating the constitutional order in suppressing the opposition. As the government moves towards stage-managed elections, Pakistan faces a tough 2024 and beyond.
Pakistan remains on edge since Imran Khan was ousted as prime minister in 2022, following defections within his coalition and a vote of no-confidence in the parliament.
The successor Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government — a motley group of 13 parties — flouted every Supreme Court order to which it was subject, leaving the Court crippled and helpless. The rump parliament swiftly passed laws favouring their agenda at the expense of the constitution. Pakistan’s constitutional order has broken down.
The federal and provincial governments are illegal, as they failed to hold constitutionally mandated elections within 90 days of the dissolution of assemblies.
Khan’s residence in Lahore — where he was holed up with his supporters — was raided and damaged in a police operation. Khan faces a media blackout with over 150 criminal cases, mostly frivolous, registered against him.
The protests in response to Khan’s arrest inside the Islamabad High Court on 9 May led to a massive crackdown and the apprehension of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party’s rank and file. Within days following their arrests, visibly haggard PTI leaders held separate choreographed press conferences with identical backdrops. With scripted statements the leaders apologised for the 9 May incidents and announced their decision to quit politics.
Many PTI leaders went underground or mysteriously disappeared, only to resurface later, renouncing politics or joining a pro-government PTI spinoff party. Some PTI members released on bail in one case found themselves immediately picked up in another.
Complicated civil–military relations
In a blatant attempt to stymie the chances of PTI’s electoral success, the party was denied its recognisable election symbol — a cricket bat. After two temporary and contradictory injunctions from single benches, a division bench of the Peshawar High Court has allowed the party symbol back to the PTI. The Election Commission of Pakistan might possibly appeal for adjudication at the Supreme Court.
The Courts remain powerless and silent. Heavy-handedness in complete defiance of the law is meant to instil fear among the general populace, in which the administration has succeeded.
Of the thousands arrested, over 102 are set for military trials, which the PDM-controlled rump parliament authorised. Military trials have always been a contentious point between civil society and the authorities. The Supreme Court, after declaring civilians’ trial by military courts illegal, has allowed them to go ahead and only restrained judgements until the Court’s final decision.
The crisis is a result of Pakistan’s complicated civil–military relations and the military’s influence over Pakistani politics. But it is the weak-kneed, selfish politicians who instead of engaging among themselves kowtow to the military to gain power.
Political engineering
Against this backdrop of political upheaval, Pakistan is in a severe economic crisis due to depleting foreign exchange reserves, a low tax-to-GDP ratio and a high debt burden, putting the country at constant risk of default. There is also a heightened risk of terrorist violence. The Pakistani Taliban movement has increased its insurgency within Pakistan from its safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Amid this turmoil, the fugitive former prime minister Nawaz Sharif is back in the country after four years of medical parole that was supposed to last four weeks. Sharif’s departure was engineered by former chief of army staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa, and his return seems similarly bargained. Instead of going to jail, his sentence was suspended. The judicial theatre has ended in Sharif being exonerated in order to facilitate his political coronation. Sharif, a person who faces serious credibility allegations due to unaccountable overseas wealth, is once again the darling of the establishment as a much-needed alternative to the disruptive populism of Khan.
This political engineering is from the template used in Pakistan for every so-called political transition since General Zia ul-Haq, the infamous general who struck at the very roots of Pakistan’s political culture, making it subservient to the military. The results of the impending elections, as with previous ones, are therefore predictably known.
‘Sick man’ of South Asia
Pakistan is now the ‘sick man’ of South Asia, not just grappling with a collapsing economy but also facing challenges on wider social and governance indicators. It ranks 161 out of 192 on the human development index, placing it in the low human development category. On the 2019 Global Competitive Index Pakistan is positioned at 110 out of 140 countries. In the global Rule of Law Index, Pakistan ranks at a lowly 130 out of 142, just a notch higher than Afghanistan.
The country remains gripped in political and economic uncertainty, leading to record inflation and 40 per cent of the population falling below the poverty line. The lack of a stable and predictable environment is a huge hurdle in solving the country’s daunting problems, which are either left to fester or met with imprudent short-term policy responses.
Politics in Pakistan is not about public service, it operates like a business. It is about power, perks, privileges and their unbridled misuse. The system is not designed to pursue social justice. Pakistan’s parties in power use the state apparatus to amass wealth and dismantle political opponents.
Pakistan cannot be sustained under the current political and economic system. These methods have been tried and have failed before. Amid grave challenges, disputed elections could inflict irreparable damage to the country. Pakistan faces very difficult years ahead.
Sajjad Ashraf served as adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore from 2009 to 2017. He was a member of Pakistan Foreign Service from 1973 to 2008 and served as ambassador to several countries.
This piece has been sourced from the East Asia Forum of the Australian National University. This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2023 in review and the year ahead.
