The establishment of a China–Myanmar joint security company highlights China’s focus on protecting investments amid Myanmar’s instability. Despite anti-junta resistance, Chinese projects face risks, including attacks by junta-backed groups.
The formation of a joint venture security company has generated significant debate concerning the expanding role of Chinese security entities in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military junta agreed to establish a committee to facilitate the company’s establishment on 22 October 2024, comprising senior officials from various ministries. This initiative highlights China’s strategic focus on securing its investments in Myanmar amid growing instability.
The committee’s mandate includes oversight of imported items such as weapons, equipment and communication devices. This move coincides with China’s broader strategy to manage its proxy armies and align their operations with the goal of stabilising relations with the Myanmar junta, potentially curbing their activities against the junta. It also reflects century-long practices of ‘frontier governance’ since imperial China.
Chinese investments in Myanmar face heightened risk due to the ongoing civil conflict. Since the initiation of ‘Operation 1027’ in October 2023 and as at 24 December 2024, 23 out of 34 Chinese projects — particularly in Rakhine, northern Shan State and the central lowlands — have fallen under the control of anti-junta forces. Despite these challenges, the Three Brotherhood Alliance and even the National Unity Government of Myanmar-affiliated People’s Defence Force have not directly targeted Chinese projects. But the junta-backed militia, Pyusawhti, allegedly attacked the Chinese Consulate in junta-controlled Mandalay on 18 October 2024 — the second such incident in 70 years of diplomatic relations.
Senior Chinese diplomatic officials have consistently pressured Myanmar’s leadership to ensure the safety of Chinese investments and citizens. But the newly proposed joint venture security company has the potential to shift the status quo by incorporating armed personnel into existing, unarmed private security arrangements — a development that could provoke both diplomatic and local tensions.
Non-State Security Actors
The establishment of this company may also be linked to recent visits by influential figures, including China’s envoys to Than Shwe — junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s mentor — and former president Thein Sein’s visit to China in June 2024. These interactions suggest a recalibration of Myanmar’s approach to Chinese involvement, despite Min Aung Hlaing’s known anti-China stance.
China’s strategy in Myanmar is adapting to current conditions by broadening its network of engagements with non-state security actors. While the establishment of this joint venture reflects efforts to secure relations with the junta, it is likely just one element of a broader strategy to broker arrangements with a wider array of actors ranging from ethnic armed organisations to private militias.
The deployment of armed Chinese security forces in Myanmar presents significant legal and political challenges. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution explicitly prohibits the stationing of foreign troops on its soil, reflecting its ‘non-aligned’ foreign policy and the military’s self-declared role as the guardian of ‘national sovereignty’. To navigate this restriction, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing appears to be planning for such personnel to be classified as a private security firm, enabling their operations while avoiding constitutional violations. These forces are ostensibly tasked with protecting Chinese interests, effectively operating as proxies for the People’s Liberation Army.
Should disputes arise, this framework allows the Chinese government to maintain plausible deniability regarding direct involvement in Myanmar’s internal affairs. By presenting the forces as independent entities, China minimises perceptions of governmental influence, mitigating potential backlash.
The 771-kilometer Myanmar–China oil and gas pipelines and other strategic engineering projects epitomise the stakes involved in this evolving security landscape. Chinese security forces stationed along the pipeline’s route could encounter resistance from revolutionary forces, further complicating operational dynamics.
Delicate Balancing Act
China’s security footprint in Myanmar also carries broader regional implications. The proximity of Chinese security personnel to India’s delayed Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is likely to amplify strategic concerns in New Delhi. Similarly, neighbouring nations such as Bangladesh and Thailand may view China’s expanded presence as a potential threat to their own security interests.
These anxieties are further mirrored in the discourse surrounding China’s Global Security Initiative, which Myanmar’s junta has endorsed. A 2023 survey indicated that 74 per cent of Myanmar’s policy community was unaware of the Index, and 67 per cent believed that it disproportionately benefits the junta. Ethnic armed groups and civil society actors remain sceptical of the initiative’s broader implications.
The introduction of Chinese private security forces into Myanmar further risks entangling Beijing more deeply in the country’s protracted civil conflict. Comparisons to security challenges along the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor exemplify the vulnerability of Chinese personnel to becoming targets in retaliation, potentially triggering diplomatic crises and undermining China’s broader regional ambitions.
As revolutionary groups maintain control over numerous Chinese project sites, the efficacy of private security forces remains uncertain. Persuading revolutionary groups to permit the resumption of Chinese projects without resistance poses a formidable challenge. The potential for increased collaboration between Chinese and Myanmar armed forces under the Global Security Initiative framework also raises concerns about the militarisation of economic corridors, with implications for regional stability.
China’s strategic calculus in Myanmar reflects a delicate balancing act. While safeguarding investments aligns with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative objectives, overreach risks fuelling resentment and triggering regional pushback. The possibility of escalating violence involving Chinese nationals underscores the precarious nature of this joint venture security project, necessitating careful evaluation of its long-term consequences.
Sike Chan is a Research Consultant at the New Rehmonnya Federated Force. He has expertise in international development and political science, and his work focuses on China–Myanmar relations, conflict and security.
This piece has been sourced from East Asia Forum.
Image from Wikimedia: Myanmar-China Border Yanlonkyine Gate, near Laukkaing
