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    Veto is the Chief Culprit but Expulsion or Suspension is Not the Remedy

    Why have Russia and the People’s Republic of China not called for an amendment of the UN Charter to streamline their membership issue? All Permanent Members are fully cognizant that that would open up a Pandora’s box, including the issue of abolition of veto and other reform issues which are not at all to their liking as part of the P-5 coterie.

    By Ambassador Anwarul K Chowdhury

    The ongoing war in Ukraine has raised the question of expulsion or suspension of the Russian Federation from the United Nations. As is known, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, its UN seat was transferred to the Russian Federation.

    With the collapse of the USSR in late 1991,the Commonwealth of Independent States signed a declaration agreeing that “Member states of the Commonwealth support Russia in taking over the USSR membership in the UN, including permanent membership in the Security Council.”

    USSR Ambassador to UN transmitted to the UN Secretary-General a letter from President of the Russian Federation stating that:

    “… the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United Nations system, is being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name ‘Russian Federation’ should be used in the United Nations in place of the name ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’. The Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations, including the financial obligations. I request that you consider this letter as confirmation of the credentials to represent the Russian Federation in United Nations organs….”

    The Secretary-General circulated the request among the UN membership. There being no objection, the Russian Federation took the USSR’s place, with President Boris Yeltsin personally taking the Russian Federation’s seat at the Security Council meeting on 31 January 1992.

    Without presenting new credentials. USSR Ambassador to UN continued serving as the first Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations.

    UN’s working arrangements

    Since its inception, the United Nations has resorted to all kinds of measures, practices, and procedures to circumvent the complexities of an intergovernmental decision-making and legal implications, heavily influenced by the position or opposition of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

    As a result, acquiescence in its various manifestations has become all pervasive in the business of the United Nations. A clear manifestation of that is practiced these days through what is known as “silent procedure” whereby the reluctant acceptance of Member States of all kinds of anomalies achieve an agreement or consensus otherwise not possible.

    The Russian veto on the Ukraine resolution in the Security Council prevented unanimous global resolve to address the situation there. The continuation of veto is an aberration of the multilateral system as practiced in the UN Security Council, thereby jeopardizing all the positive UN efforts to maintain international peace and security.

    Change in multilateral system

    The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed more clearly than ever that the “global ideological struggle” that had for so long dominated the international scene does not exist anymore. And the new realities must be translated into a different set of global institutions unless the existing one undertake major and all-pervasive reforms of their decision-making and operational practices and procedures.

    The expulsion or suspension of one of the five veto-wielding permanent members would not necessarily result in effective maintenance of the global peace and security. There would still be four others with the ability to deny any time a consensus decision with which any one of them does not agree.

    Veto, the chief culprit

    The chief culprit in the failure of unified global action by the UN is the continuation of the irrational practice of veto. As a matter, I have said on record that, if only one reform action could be taken, it should be the abolition of veto. Believe me, the veto power influences not only the decisions of the Security Council but also all work of the UN, including importantly the choice of the Secretary-General.

    I believe the abolition of veto requires a greater priority attention in the reforms process than the enlargement of the Security Council membership with additional permanent ones. Such permanency is simply undemocratic. I believe that the veto power is not “the cornerstone of the United Nations” but in reality, its tombstone.

    The case of China

    Unlike the question of the replacement of USSR membership by the Russian Federation in 1991, the case of the recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by the UN is straightforward.

    It was decided by the apex body of the UN system, the General Assembly in its groundbreaking resolution 2758 titled “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations” which was adopted by two-thirds majority on 25 October 1971 in accordance with the UN Charter.

    The resolution recognized the People’s Republic of China as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and expelled “forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” from the United Nations.

    Following adoption of Resolution 2758, the Beijing government began representing China at the UN from 15 November 1971 and its delegates were seated at the UN Security Council meeting held on 23 November 1971, the first such meeting where representatives of the Beijing government represented China with its veto power as a permanent member of the Council.

    UN’s clear position on Taiwan

    Over the years, Taiwan’s efforts to revive the application for UN membership separately for itself has received no support of the UN membership in general.

    Reflecting the long-standing UN policy is mirrored in the “Final Clauses of “Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties, Handbook”, 2003 published by the UN, stating that:

    “…regarding the Taiwan Province of China, the Secretary-General follows the General Assembly’s guidance incorporated in resolution 2758 (XXVI) of the General Assembly of 25 October 1971 on the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. The General Assembly decided to recognize the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations. Hence, instruments received from the Taiwan Province of China will not be accepted by the Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary.”

    It is relevant to recall that in 2007, Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-moon rejected Taiwan’s membership bid to “join the UN under the name of Taiwan”, citing Resolution 2758 as acknowledging that Taiwan is part of China, although it is important to note, not the People’s Republic of China.

    Why not amend the Charter

    I have confronted on many occasions the question why Russia and PRC have not called for an amendment of the UN Charter to streamline their membership issue. For that, my opinion is that all Permanent Members are fully cognizant that that would open up a Pandora’s box, including the issue of abolition of veto and other reform issues which are not at all to their liking as part of the P-5 coterie.

     

    Ambassador Anwarul K Chowdhury, is Former Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN; President of the UN Security Council (2000 and 2001); Senior Special Adviser to UN General Assembly President (2011-2012) and Former Under-Secretary-General and High Representative of the UN.

     

    This piece has been sourced from Inter Press Service

    Image: United Nations

     

    Afghanistan: Journalists live under threats from Taliban

    Authorities in Afghanistan censor the work of journalists and even resort to beating up journalists covering issues that the Taliban finds discomforting.

    Taliban authorities have carried out far-reaching censorship and violence against Afghan media in district and provincial centres, says Human Rights Watch.

    This has drastically limited critical reporting in Afghanistan, particularly impacting journalists outside the capital city Kabul. Women journalists are worst affected and face the most intense repression.

    Journalists in the provinces described Taliban members threatening, detaining, and beating them and their colleagues who were trying to report the news, HRW says, adding that many journalists have felt compelled to self-censor and report only Taliban statements and official events.

    “Taliban harassment and attacks on journalists outside major urban areas have largely gone unreported, causing media outlets in outlying provinces to self-censor or close altogether,” said Fereshta Abbasi, Afghanistan researcher at Human Rights Watch. “In many provinces, the Taliban have virtually eliminated reporting on a wide range of issues and have driven women journalists out of the profession.”

    On February 2, 2022, the Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, told a meeting of the Afghan Journalists Safety Committee, a media advocacy group, that journalists should consider “national interests, Islamic values, and national unity” before publishing. He said that a new media commission would be established to address any problems, and that the authorities would enforce the former government’s media law. He also said without elaborating that “women can work freely in the media by observing Islamic and national principles.”

    Music on radio and television has disappeared since the Taliban took over. Even advertisements were not allowed to play background music. A journalist in Kapisa said, “there are no longer any political shows or live programs; these have been replaced with more Islamic programs.”

    Restrictions, fear

    The HRW report speaks of journalists throughout Afghanistan facing severe restrictions on doing their work by the Taliban. This is in violation of the Afghan media law and international human rights standards on freedom of expression and the media. An estimated 80 percent of women journalists across Afghanistan have lost their jobs or left the profession since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, and hundreds of media outlets have closed.

    The HRW study involved 24 journalists and other media workers in 17 of the country’s 34 provinces. Journalists in each of these provinces said the Taliban actively monitor their publications and compel them to share the content of their reports with the provincial directorate of information and culture before publication. Many of the journalists said that Taliban intelligence officials regularly meet with media organizations to tell them what to publish and to warn them not to contradict Taliban policies or to report on acts of violence by Taliban officials.

    “We all fear for our safety,” a reporter in Baghlan said. “If something happens to a journalist, there is no institution or system to support them, or to seek justice. There is no support for the media workers in Afghanistan right now.”

    Thrashed

    Many journalists said they or their colleagues had been beaten for trying to report on anti-Taliban protests, arbitrary detention, rising food prices, and other subjects that cast Taliban officials in a bad light. In some provinces, Taliban officials told all women journalists to stop working. The few who are allowed to work can no longer have roles in which they come face-to-face with the public.

    “Getting the news from Afghanistan’s rural areas has never been easy, but the Taliban’s repression of the media in the provinces is dangerous both for the journalists and the people whose lives are harmed by unreported abuses,” Abbasi said. “Governments should press the Taliban to end to all attacks on the media, whether in Kabul or the countryside.”

    A female journalist in Balkh said that, in September, Taliban soldiers had beaten her on the street while she was trying to cover women’s protests. She said: “Journalists can easily get beaten by Taliban soldiers in the streets and no one will be held responsible. In the past few months, a journalist from Arezo TV has been beaten and a Pajhwak journalist in Balkh has been arrested.”

    A journalist in Kandahar said that, in December, Taliban members beat him while he was on the street preparing a report on the rise in food prices. That month, the Taliban detained two journalists and badly beat them in custody. One was released after a few hours, the other after six days. Their colleague said that both have remained under surveillance.

    An editor working outside of Kabul said that, in December, one of his journalists went to the passport office to report on the difficulties Afghans were having obtaining passports. A member of the Taliban police badly beat him and confiscated his camera.

    Nepal to begin talks with UK on Equality for Gurkhas

    The Gurkha’s struggles for pay parity are steeped in history. Retired British Gurkha soldiers were left to fight a lonely battle for their salaries, perks and pensions thus far.

    The government of Nepal has decided to join talks with the British government on the pension-related demands of Britain’s ex-Gurkha soldiers. The issue of an equality in pensions is a long-pending demand of the Gurkha soldiers.

    Nepal’s newly appointed ambassador to UK, Gyan Chandra Acharya to lead the discussion with the British government. Nepal’s ministry of foreign affairs wants the ambassador to prioritise the discussions.

    Discussions are on with members of ex-Gurkha servicemen associations to prepared the grounds for the talks.

    In July 2021, a group of veteran British Gurkha soldiers staged a 13-day long relay hunger strike close to Downing Street, the seat of power. The hunger strike was organized by the British Gurkha Satyagraha United Struggle Committee (BGSUSC), a group formed to carry out the campaign for equal pension for the Gurkhas, besides other demands.

    Campaign for equality

    They started a campaign for “justice” in 1990 in Nepal led by different associations of former soldiers. In 2009, the Gurkhas were granted the right of abode in the UK which meant that they could move to live in UK – a move best with cultural incompatibilities and harsh living conditions on measly pensions.

    Years of negotiations have meant that Gurkha soldiers recruited in later years are not as discriminated. But the retired soldiers have been left to fight a lonely battle for their salaries, perks and pensions thus far.

    A list of 13 demands prepared by the BGSUSC in May 2021 and rallies and a relay hunger strike have yielded little – eventually bringing the Nepal government into the picture. The pressure to deliver is now on the country’s new ambassador.

    Nepal is not a member of the Commonwealth either and the present talks are also prompted by a debate in Nepal about letting its young people fight the battles of a distant country.

    Every year, thousands of young Nepalis compete for employment with the British army’s Brigade of Gurkhas and the Gurkha contingent of the Singapore police. There are even training academies that have sprung up, training them for the physical tests as well as rudimentary three-Rs.

    History of discrimination

    The Gurkha campaign has a 30-year-long history. Or actually, over two centuries since the Gurkhas began serving the British Crown in 1815 – starting with three regiments to fight the British battles, including the wars against the Marathas (1817-19), the Jats (1824-26) the two Sikh wars (1845-46 and 1949), the second Afghan war of 1878-80 and the Burma war of 1885.

    Over two lakh Gurkhas also served the British army during the first and second world wars.

    The Gurkhas were not paid from the UK treasury. Instead, their salaries were sourced from colonial governments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, calculating their remuneration dues on living standards in Nepal.

    Many soldiers returned to Nepal complaining about a lack of compensation. The Gurkhas were paid less than their counterparts in the British Army and this disparity also reflected in their pensions.

     

    Image: Wikimedia. Picture by Stig Berge

    Ukraine Challenges Legitimacy of Russia’s UN Membership

    The USSR and the Republic of China – not the ‘Russian Federation’ or ‘the People’s Republic of China’ (PRC) — are still two of the five permanent members of the most powerful body in the UN.

    By Thalif Deen / Inter Press Service

    The overwhelming condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine — which triggered a veto from Russia and an abstention from China last week — has raised a challenging question about the legitimacy of UN memberships of both countries which are permanent members of the Security Council.

    The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) ceased to exist back in 1991, with the Russian Federation assuming the rights and obligations as a successor state.

    And the Republic of China (Taiwan) was expelled from the United Nations — and ousted from its highly-prized permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) — about 51 years ago.

    But according to the UN charter, “the USSR and the Republic of China” — not the “Russian Federation” or “the People’s Republic of China” (PRC) — are still two of the five permanent members of the most powerful body in the Organization.

    If both countries assume they are rightful successors, why aren’t they going before the General Assembly to help amend the Charter? As a result of the anomaly, the un-amended UN charter remains outdated and a relic of a distant past.

    According to Article 108 of the Charter, amendments must be adopted by two-thirds of the 193 members of the General Assembly and be ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all five permanent members of the Security Council, namely the US, UK, France, China and Russia.

    Russia’s membership is not legitimate

    The Charter has been amended five times:

        1. In 1965, Articles 23 was amended to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members.
        2. In 1965, Article 27 was amended to increase the required number of Security Council votes from seven to nine.
        3. In 1965, Article 61 was amended to enlarge the economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members.
        4. In 1968, Article 109 was amended to change the requirements for a General Conference of Member States for reviewing the Charter.
        5. In 1973, Article 61 was amended again to further enlarge the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54.

    But it was never amended to reflect the two successor states, namely the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

    During the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly last week, Ukraine’s Ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, pointed out that while “the Russian Federation has done everything possible to legitimize its presence at the United Nations, its membership is not legitimate, as the General Assembly never voted on its admission to the Organization following the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991”.

    With the collapse of the USSR in late 1991,the Commonwealth of Independent States signed a declaration agreeing that “Member states of the Commonwealth support Russia in taking over the USSR membership in the UN, including permanent membership in the Security Council.”

    And in October 1971, the General Assembly decided to recognize the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations.

    Scenarios of succession states

    But one longstanding question remains: why has Russia and PRC not moved for an amendment of the charter?

    Is it that both countries fear they will not be able to garner the two thirds majority needed in the General Assembly for any amendments to the charter?

    In a December 1991 inter-office memo, the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs said: “For the present, the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remains a member of the United Nations with all the rights and obligations of memberships. Its representatives, whose credentials have been approved by the Credentials Committee, continue to occupy the seat of the USSR in all organs of the United Nations.”

    “In considering the changes which may come about in the near future and their implications within the internal constitutional order of the United Nations, it should be borne in mind that the United Nations will, of necessity, be obliged to proceed from whatever arrangements are made internally in the Soviet Union in relation to the break — up of the USSR and the decisions which are taken by the republics regarding their individual status in international law and that of any collective entity which might emerges.”

    The memo lays out several scenarios over succession states, including “a similar issue following the partition of India and Pakistan when certain Members objected to India’s automatic retention of its seat while Pakistan had to apply as a new state.”

    Responsibility of Member States

    But the question of an un-amended Charter remains unanswered.

    In response to a question, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters March 4, the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) had “undertaken a review of its relevant files”.

    “I was informed that the search is continuing through the paper-based files, and non-digitized files, and that some related documents have been found, including an interoffice memo dated 19 December 1991”.

    He said it has been declassified, and “I can share it with you if you are interested.”

    The interoffice memo, he pointed out, does not in any way alter the Secretariat position, which is that, in accordance with the UN Charter, “the question of UN membership is the responsibility of Member States”.

    In his 165-page book on the Security Council titled “Of Foxes and Chickens– Oligarchy and Global Power in the Security Council”, James Paul, then Executive Director of the New York-based Global Police Forum, writes the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 provided another act in this strange drama (following the admission of PRC).

    A number of successor states came into being of which the Russian Federation was the largest.

    “It was certainly not the major power that the USSR had been, having a far reduced population and economy. The new state was not clearly the same as the old, but the permanent members did not want to open up the dreaded membership question.”

    “With most diplomats celebrating a holiday (at the time) or out of town on vacation, no delegation raised immediate objections. Without even calling a meeting to examine the matter, the Council President took silence as consent.”
    Need a more consistent policy

    Meanwhile, any attempts to expel or suspend Russia from the General Assembly — primarily because of its invasion of Ukraine — will be difficult to justify judging by the track record of some of the member states.

    Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, who has written extensively on the politics of the Security Council, told IPS this proposal seems like a stretch.

    The United Nations technically might be able to remove Russia from the Security Council, but politically it would come across as vindictive and would likely weaken the United Nations’ authority, he said.

    “There would also be the question of double-standards,” he pointed out.

    Morocco was elected to a non-permanent seat in the Security Council in the 1990s despite its invasion, occupation, and illegal annexation of Western Sahara.

    Indonesia was elected to the Council during the same decade following its conquest and occupation of East Timor.

    And Israel’s admission into the United Nations, he argued, was conditional on the grounds “that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter, and is able and willing to carry out those obligations,” which it clearly has not done, as exemplified through its conquests of neighboring countries, its illegal colonization of occupied territories, and its illegal annexation of parts of them, he noted.

    “For the United Nations to take such drastic action targeting Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, it would need to have a more consistent policy towards aggressor nations,” declared Zunes.

    China, Russia – not identical cases

    Since the international community has pretty recognized there is only one China and plenty of member states have changed their formal names over time, he pointed out, “I don’t think the representation of China is an issue. If it did come to a vote, I’m quite confident they would get a two-thirds majority.”

    The Soviet/Russia case is more complicated, he noted. “Even here, though, since a case could be made that the Soviet Union was the successor state to the Russian Empire, a reduced Soviet Union would still be Russia. I don’t think Russia would have had any problems getting the two-thirds support either—until recently,” he declared.

     

    This piece has been sourced from Inter Press Service

    Image: UN Photo / Evan Schneider

    Why is India’s financial aid offer to Sri Lanka getting delayed?

    Sri Lankan finance minister Basil Rajapaksa’s visit to clinch a big-ticket loan from India has been postponed. Is this go-slow a deliberate strategy to signal China?

    Sri Lanka’s economic crisis is aggravating each passing day – foreign exchange reserves have tanked and inflation has made food beyond the reach of the ordinary citizen.

    Over the past six months, India has announced assistance to Sri Lanka of a US$ 500 million oil line of credit, a debt deferral of US$ 515 million and a currency swap to the tune of US$ 400 million. These are besides the COVID-19 relief in the form of rapid antigen test kits and liquid medical oxygen India has provided.

    The line of credit that the island nation thought was a lifeline and fuel on credit. But this is yet to see the light of day.

    India has sought a road map from Sri Lanka. But economists and bureaucrats besides the island nation’s central bank are yet to come up with a plan they can share with the Indian government. The roadmap needs to elaborate on how they country will overcome its economic crisis.

    Importantly, the roadmap is also required to detail how bilateral economic plans will be implemented in the North and the East of the island.

    There are strategic interests too – ranging from the harbour of Trincomalee to selling Donier surveillance aircraft for the Sri Lanka Air Force. Both issues are in a bureaucratic tailspin, toughened by prospects of an upcoming BIMSTEC summit in Colombo on March 30.

    Sri Lankan finance minister Basil Rajapaksa’s visit to Indian has been postponed. This visit, say Sri Lankan officials, is important to clinch a big-ticket loan. But, there are others who say that the go-slow is a purposeful bureaucratic strategy to signal China.

    India’s interests

    India is also negotiating a few energy generation projects with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s policy of moving away from coal-powered electricity plants has already jolted an earlier Indo-Japanese joint partnership plan in the country.

    New Delhi is keen on a pact for solar-power projects in Trincomalee and in the Delft Island. The Delft Island deal is pending for some time since the Asian Development Bank tendered for interests. High decibel reactions from the Chinese embassy on the subject was matched by a low decibel visit to the island by Indian industrialist Gautam Adani whose business group has an interest in the project.

    Sri Lanka’s economy has been in trouble since an abrupt government fiat to farmers to switch to organic farming. It caused a poor harvest and the government was suddenly saddled with huge financial costs of importing organic fertilisers

    This was further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic that resulted in halting tourist arrivals to the emerald island. Inflows from tourism contribute largely to Sri Lankan foreign exchange. The pandemic also brought back Sri Lankan overseas workers who would otherwise have sent remittances back home.

    The rising price of international petroleum crude in the past weeks has also added to the deteriorating economic situation.

    Alluding to the delays in drawing up plans for closer cooperation with India, Sri Lanka foreign minister G L Peiris had said that these were due to “logistical issues and bureaucratic reasons”.

    Those bureaucratic reasons are now proving to be too expensive for the island nation.

     

    Scientists describe a new Himalayan snake species found via Instagram

    Locked down at home during the pandemic last year, a postgraduate student photographed a hitherto unseen snake in his backyard and uploaded it to Instagram, attracting attention of herpetologists. The new-to-science species belongs to the group of kukri snakes.

    By Liz Kimbrough

    Researchers have found a snake species new to science in the Himalayas — on Instagram!

    During the COVID-19 lockdowns, Virender Bhardwaj, a master’s student at Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, explored the backyard of his house in Chamba at the foot of the Himalayas. He began photographing the snakes, lizards, frogs and insects around home and uploading those photos to the social media platform, Instagram.

    In one of these posts, uploaded on June 5, 2020, Zeeshan A. Mirza, a herpetologist from the National Centre for Biological Sciences in Bengaluru noticed an unfamiliar snake. The snake belonged to a group commonly called kukri snakes, named after their teeth which are curved like a kukri, or Nepali dagger. But this specimen didn’t match the common kukri snake of the region.

    Identification process

    Bhardwaj was able to locate two of the snakes, enough for the team, which included Mirza and Harshil Patel of Veer Narmad South Gujarat University, Surat, western India, to begin the identification process.

    The work was put on hold due to COVID-19 restrictions, which made visiting labs and natural history museums difficult. But once the labs opened back up in early 2021, molecular data for the species confirmed it was indeed different from the common kukri snake. Morphological data from the literature, as well as computerised tomography (CT) scans of the species’ skeletal structure further revealed that the species was undescribed.

    The new-to-science species was named Oligodon churahensis, after the Churah Valley in Himachal Pradesh, where the species was discovered. A description of the species is published in the journal Evolutionary Systematics.

    Diverse backyards

    The western Himalayas are comparatively less explored than many other regions, and dedicated work in this region is necessary to reveal the biodiversity of the region, Mirza says. The region harbours unique species of reptiles that scientists have only begun to unravel in the last couple of years.

    “It is quite interesting to note that how an image from Instagram led to the discovery of such a pretty snake that was unknown to the world,” Mirza told Mongabay.

    “Exploration of your own backyard may yield species that are perhaps undocumented. Lately, people want to travel to remote biodiversity hotspots to find new or rare species, but if one looks at their own backyard, one may end up finding a new species right there.”

     

    This story was first published on Mongabay.com 

    Image: Virender Bhardwaj 

    Russian military control of Ukraine nuclear plants cause for concern, IAEA warns

    Reports that Ukraine’s, and Europe’s, largest nuclear power plant is under the control of Russian forces is a cause for grave concern, the IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi, said on Sunday.

    In a statement released by the IAEA, Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said he had been informed by Ukrainian authorities that, although regular staff continue to operate the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, any action of plant management – including measures related to the technical operation of the six reactor units – requires prior approval by the Russian commander of the Russian forces that took control of the site last week.

    Mr. Grossi said that this development contravenes one of the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security that he outlined at a meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 2 March: that “operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”.

    Communication restricted

    Ukraine’s nuclear regulator has informed the IAEA that it is having major problems communicating with staff operating Zaporizhzhya, due to Russian forces at the site switching off some mobile networks and blocking the internet. Some mobile phone communication is understood to still be possible, albeit with poor quality, but fixed phone lines, as well as e-mails and fax, are reportedly no longer functioning.

    The IAEA noted that this situation contravenes another of its seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety, that there must be “reliable communications with the regulator and others”.

    “I’m extremely concerned about these developments that were reported to me today”. Said Mr. Grossi. “Just a few days after I presented the seven main elements of nuclear safety and security to the IAEA Board, several of them are already being compromised. In order to be able to operate the plant safely and securely, management and staff must be allowed to carry out their vital duties in stable conditions without undue external interference or pressure”.

    “The deteriorating situation regarding vital communications between the regulator and the Zaporizhzhya NPP is also a source of deep concern, especially during an armed conflict that may jeopardize the country’s nuclear facilities at any time”, continued the Director-General. “Reliable communications between the regulator and the operator are a critical part of overall nuclear safety and security”.

    Radiation levels normal

    Despite the communication issues, the regulator was able to provide updated information about the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya NPP to the IAEA, and to confirm that radiation levels there remained normal.

    Operational teams at the plant are now rotating in three shifts but, the regulator added, the availability and supply of food is limited, which is having a negative impact on staff morale.

    Chornobyl, Mariupol safety

    Responding to reports that the technical staff and guards at the site of the Chornobyl nuclear accident site have not been rotated since 23 February, Mr. Grossi called on the Russian forces controlling the site to allow them to be relieved by other colleagues and rest, in order to carry out their jobs safely and security.

    The Ukraine regulator has informed the IAEA that communication with Chornobyl is currently limited to emails.

    In another worrying development, the regulator said that all communications have been lost with the enterprises and institutions in the port city of Mariupol that use category 1-3 radiation sources, and there is no information about their status. Such radioactive material, warned the IAEA, can cause serious harm to people if not secured and managed properly.

    Ukraine nuclear danger

    Ukraine gave up its rights to nuclear weapons following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and all the nuclear weaponry on its territory was removed by June 1996. However, the country retained the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and some 114 enterprises are believed to have nuclear materials of some kind, including four nuclear power plants (NPPs).

    The military conflict in Ukraine is the first to take place on the territory of a country with large nuclear facilities. On Thursday night, Zaporizhzhia NPP, the largest and most powerful in Europe, was shelled, raising fears of an explosion, and radiation leaks.

    Memories of the Chornobyl disaster, which occurred on April 26, 1986, have also been revived: Chornobyl was one of the most serious nuclear incidents in human history, and led to a radioactive plume covering a large part of north-eastern Europe.

    Thursday’s attack on Zaporizhzhia saw shells hitting a training complex near the nuclear reactors. No radioactive material was released, and the plant’s safety systems were not compromised.

    However, an accident or explosion at Zaporizhzhia, which is far bigger than Chornobyl, could lead to far more serious consequences than the 1986 incident. This could result from fresh attacks, or even a loss of electricity. The latter situation could prevent the reactor cooling system from working, and lead to an explosion (this was the cause of the Chornobyl disaster).

    Miles’ Law and the War in Ukraine

    The vast majority of the people on the planet don’t give a hoot about who is right and who is wrong. They will simply curse the big powers whose ambitions have raised the price of food and fuel, making their life ever harder.

    This aphorism which dates back to the late 1940s points out that one’s position on issues (where you stand) is shaped by your relationship with the events taking place (where you sit).

     

    Since the start of the Ukrainian war I have been working in a small country very much in Russia’s shadow. Local TV channels are dominated by broadcasts from Russia. Russian is widely understood here, much more than English, and these channels provide a major source of news.

    Not having any Russian, most of my information over the past week has come through listening to the BBC World Service on the radio. By chance the other day I stumbled across the English language channel of Russian state TV and was fascinated by their well-argued and highly polished presentation of the Russian version of facts. It was interesting, although not surprising, to see how differently the war is presented by the two sides.

    What is seen in as an invasion of a free democratic country in the West is presented by Moscow as a necessary intervention to halt the interrupted eastern creep of NATO – an issue that threatens their very survival and on which they have repeatedly warned NATO leaders.

    The West sees the events as the imposition of Russian rule on freedom loving Ukrainians, while Moscow presents it as the liberation of the Russian speaking people of the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics from Ukrainian bullying and thuggery. The West calls it an invasion and a war; Moscow calls it an operation.

    Ordinary citizens

    Reporters from each side interview “ordinary citizens” to provide support for their point of view. News agencies such as the BBC and CNN interview ordinary Ukrainians who say how they love their country and want to live in peace but are prepared to defend their homes and families; the other side also interview ordinary people of the Donbas who offer tearful thanks to their Russian liberators.

    The arming of ordinary citizens by the Ukrainian Government is seen in western media as giving patriots the means to defend their homeland; in Moscow’s version all this does in armed criminal gangs – some of these have been turning up in pickup trucks to load up dozens of machine guns and thousands of rounds of ammunitions. Moscow say 500 of their soldiers have lost the life, the other side reports a number more than 10 times that.

    It is quite futile to ask who is right and about what. Maybe the Russians are right about the eastern creep of NATO but maybe they are lying about the number of deaths. Or maybe both sides are partly right – say about the distribution of arms; it may well be that ordinary patriotic Ukrainians as well as criminal gangs are arming themselves.

    In the age of internet and social media, most people have access to both versions of the facts and have a choice about which narrative to believe? And there is where Miles’ Law kicks in – most people will choose the narrative that fits in with their past experiences and their current needs and desires.

    National interests

    At Government level the choice of which narrative to accept, and what positions to take, for example at the UN, will be based on the economic, political and strategic interests of the country or of its rulers. Did Palau (population 18,000) make any objective assessment of facts before cosponsoring the UN motion condemning Russia, or did they simply go along with the wishes of Australia and New Zealand their largest trading partners and donors? Did the Government of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka assess the evidence or did they abstain in the General Assembly vote in order to have the option to make deals with whichever side offers better terms? And did China abstain because it wants to prepare the ground for its own invasion of Taiwan? And what about Afghanistan? Is their vote condemning Russia based on what they believe are the facts of the matter, or is it simply because their representative at the UN is still the one appointed by the Ashraf Ghani Government and whose salaries and expenses are likely paid by the USA?

    Will positions change?

    And what about “ordinary individuals”? What do they believe? Those who have lived in Iraq or in Afghanistan, or in other places where USA and western countries have played havoc, will tend to have sympathies with the Russian narrative. For them someone is finally standing up to western bullying; someone is prepared to give NATO a bloody nose.

    In contrast many in Europe will believe the Western version of facts – that Putin is a power hunger lunatic, a megalomaniac who is single handedly driving the invasion, and he will soon be replaced by the oligarchs who see their wealth and privileges dwindling due to sanctions. Their views and predictions are based not only on cultural ties with the Ukraine but is influenced by the fact that most Europeans have benefited from closer economic links with Russia and in particular on plentiful Russian energy supplies – supplies that are at now at risk. For them the quicker the war is over and Russians booted out of the Ukraine the better for everyone. And what if the war is not over quickly? What if energy supplies are cut off, if prices go on rising, and millions of refugees continue to turn up? Will positions change?

    But whatever views we hold, and however strongly we wish to argue about who is right and who is wrong, let us not forget that the vast majority of the people on the planet don’t give a hoot about who is right and who is wrong. They will simply curse the big powers whose ambitions have raised the price of food and fuel, making their life ever harder.

     

    Daud Khan is a consultant and advisor for various government and international agencies. He lives partly in Italy and partly in Pakistan.

    This piece has been sourced from Inter Press Service.

    Egypt Rushes to Find Alternative Wheat Suppliers Following Ukraine Crisis

    Egypt’s strategic wheat stock is approximately five million tonnes, enough to cover the local market’s needs for nine months, and will be augmented when the local wheat harvest season begins mid-April.

    By Hisham Allam

    Egypt is scrambling to find alternate sources of wheat after the Russian invasion of Ukraine has put supply to the country in jeopardy. This is especially urgent because the price of bread in Egypt has in the past sparked protests in the country.

    Russia and Ukraine are key players in the global grain market, with their wheat exports accounting for 23 per cent of international trade in 2021-22, according to the US Department of Agriculture.

    Egypt, Lebanon, and Libya are among the MENA region’s top wheat importers from Ukraine.

    In 2021, Egypt imported 6.1 million tonnes of wheat; 4.2 million came from Russia, worth US$1.2 billion, representing 69.4 per cent of total Egyptian wheat imports. Imports from Ukraine amounted to 651,400 tonnes, worth US$649.4 million, accounting for 10.7 per cent of total imports.

    Over the last 50 years, the price of bread has been a politically controversial topic in Egypt, triggering various protests. A subsidised flat loaf costs 0.05 Egyptian pounds, less than one US cent.

    Subsidised bread

    Naguib Sawiris, the Egyptian tycoon, appealed to Egypt’s Minister of Supply on February 22 to acquire and store large quantities of wheat.

    “We must purchase and stockpile wheat as quickly as possible before the Ukraine-Russia war breaks out, “Sawiris had tweeted.

    Mohamed Elhady, who runs a family-owned bakery at Menoufia Governorate, 80 km north Cairo, is deeply concerned about the business he has been running for 20 years.

    “The government-subsidised bread diminishes the bakery’s profit margin since we are required to sell a loaf of bread at the government-set price. But we get the cost difference through banks after calculating the number of loaves produced by each bakery using a smart ration card system,” Elhady said.

    “Some bakeries gather cards from ordinary residents and report fictitious sales to gain the value of subsidised bread for themselves, increasing their earnings considerably while reselling raw wheat on the informal market,” he explains.

    To eat less or to pay more

    In August 2021, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said it was time to increase the country’s subsidised bread price, revisiting the issue for the first time since 1977, when then-president Anwar Sadat reversed a price rise in the face of riots.

    “It is time for the five-piece loaf to increase in price,” Sisi said.

    Elhady believes that the government will turn the president’s words into action soon, expecting that the new increase in subsidised bread will take place by April, the anticipated time for receiving wheat from the new suppliers. This will decrease daily production rates and, therefore, his profits.

    “Once the wheat prices increase, the government will reduce the number of subsidised loaves from five a day to three or increase the price of the 5-piaster loaf,” Elhady says.

    The president is also expected to exclude more citizens from the subsidy programme covering more than 60 million Egyptians.

    “People will have to choose; to eat less or to pay more,” Elhady adds.

    Strategic stocks

    Egypt’s main state buying agency, the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC), has issued a second international wheat tender to import wheat from April 13 to 26. The tender was issued 48 hours after it was cancelled because it only received a single offer of French wheat. A least two offers are required before a purchase can go ahead.

    The Egyptian GASC set the end of February as a deadline to receive offers for the new tender. In addition to Russia and Ukraine, the GASC sought bids from the United States, Canada, France, Bulgaria, Australia, Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Paraguay, and Kazakhstan. The delivery needs to take place before April 1, 2022.

    Despite the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian military escalation, an Egyptian ship carrying 60 tons of Ukrainian wheat has left the Ukrainian ports and is en route to Egypt, a grain consultant at the Ministry of Supply, Salah Hamza, told IPS.

    “This shipment was contracted with Ukraine for $361 per ton in an international tender in December 2021. The consignment is part of a 300 000-ton wheat shipment that will arrive by March 2022.”

    “Egypt produces 275 million loaves of bread per day, consumes 900,000 tonnes of wheat per month, and the strategic stock is enough for the next five months, in addition to 4 million tons expected from the domestic harvest by mid-April, “Hamza adds.

    Egypt has a strategic reserve of wheat, enough to cover the local market’s needs for nine months, the Cabinet’s spokesman, Nader Saad said.

    The strategic wheat stock is approximately five million tonnes, according to Saad, and will be augmented when the local wheat harvest season begins on April 15.

    In February of this year, the price of an ardeb of wheat climbed by 65 percent compared with February of last year.

    The US Foreign Agricultural Service expected Egypt’s wheat consumption in 2021-22 would exceed 21.3 million tonnes, up about 2.4 % from 2020-21.

     

    This piece has been sourced from Inter Press Service.

    India’s aloof response to the Ukraine crisis

    Moscow’s decision to recognise the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and then launch a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine has created a tricky balancing act for India. Delhi’s immediate reaction to the crisis has been restrained, neutral and focused on ensuring the safety of its nationals inside Ukraine.

    By Artyom Lukin and Aditya Pareek

    Several hours after Russian military action was underway, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Modi urged that all violence should be ceased immediately and reiterated India’s emphasis on diplomacy and ‘honest and sincere dialogue’ between Russia and NATO.

    On 26 February 2022, the United Nations Security Council held a vote on a resolution demanding that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. India was among the three countries to abstain, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. India’s UN envoy expressed his ‘regret that the path of diplomacy was given up’. India also abstained on a procedural resolution to call for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

    Modi also held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he expressed ‘his deep anguish about the loss of lives and properties’ but refrained from directly criticising Russia.

    The India–Russia relationship is officially characterised as a ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’. The entente between Moscow and Delhi dates back decades. Though the bond is no longer the de facto alliance it once was in the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow remains Delhi’s an important strategic partner, on par with the United States. The two nations don’t have any significant areas of disagreement and both share a fundamental interest in a multipolar balance of power in Eurasia.

    India’s security stake

    India relies on Russia for the majority of its imported military equipment, nuclear submarine technology and some vital space faring technology. A highlight of India–Russian defence cooperation has been the US$5.43 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system, which Russia began delivering in December 2021. Russian-made weapons are critical to India’s ability to counter its main external threat — China.

    There are also perhaps ideational factors behind India’s reluctance to censure Russian actions toward Ukraine. The conflict over Ukraine may have some parallels with India’s historic traumas. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union that led to the birth of an independent Ukraine was not dissimilar to the partition of the British Raj, which produced India and Pakistan, two culturally close but still antagonistic entities. Putin characterises the modern state of Ukraine in antagonistic terms as an ‘anti-Russia’ project.

    Western powers portray the conflict as a struggle between an imperialistic autocracy and a young democracy, but Delhi may not buy this narrative. India has always been somewhat sceptical about the US-led discourse on liberal democracy. This remains the case despite the Westernisation of Indian elites. Under Modi, India has been evolving in an illiberal and ethno-nationalistic direction. It is an open secret that India wants to maintain its sphere of influence in parts of South Asia.

    India does not have many significant security interests in Europe, which helps explain its relative aloofness to the Ukraine crisis. But Delhi does have some stakes in Ukraine. For instance, the Indian Space Research Organisation’s semi cryogenic engine is being developed based on Ukrainian supplied RD-810 designs and many Indian navy warships depend on Ukrainian gas turbines, including those under construction at Russian shipyards. So India has a national security stake in not alienating Ukraine.

    There’s China too

    Another reason for India’s repeated calls for the cessation of violence, de-escalation and resolving the situation through diplomacy is high energy prices, which may negatively affect India’s stressed economy.

    Delhi’s position on the Ukraine crisis also needs to be examined in the context of the Russia–China–India triangle. Some subtle evolution has taken place here. India spoke of Russia’s ‘legitimate interests’ in the wake of the 2014 events on the Crimean Peninsula, which could be interpreted as a position of implicit support for Russia. By contrast, Beijing maintained a more neutral position at the time. India has also since then abstained or voted against Russia-denouncing UN resolutions concerning Crimea.

    However, as the Ukraine crisis continues to unfold, China seems to have become more supportive of Russia as indicated in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks during a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. During the call, Wang Yi mentioned ‘Russia’s legitimate concerns on security issues’. India has made no such reference to ‘Russia’s legitimate interests’ and remains more neutral compared to China in the current crisis.

    A key concern for Indian foreign policy is how the Ukraine crisis — and its unpredictable outcome — will affect Russia’s relations with China. There is little doubt that the security mess in Europe and the West’s ostracisation of Russia will push Moscow further toward Beijing. If Russia’s dependence on China deepens and Western condemnation of Russia intensifies, the Delhi–Moscow ‘privileged partnership’ could be at serious risk.

     

    Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok.

    Aditya Pareek is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution.

     

    This piece has been sourced from East Asia Forum of the Australian National University