As the U.S. eyes expanding nuclear sharing across more NATO allies, critics warn this move risks unravelling the global non-proliferation regime and escalating arms races rather than securing peace.

In a dangerous shift in nuclear posture that has sent ripples of concern through disarmament advocates worldwide, reports indicate the United States is considering broadening its nuclear weapons-hosting arrangements within NATO. According to sources briefed on confidential discussions, this could see additional European nations – particularly those on NATO’s eastern flank like Poland and the Baltic states – hosting U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft and potentially the weapons themselves.

Currently, six NATO members – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom – participate in the alliance’s nuclear-sharing programme, hosting approximately 100 U.S. B61 tactical nuclear bombs deliverable by dual-capable aircraft. Expanding this network would mark a significant escalation in forward deployment, bringing nuclear assets closer to Russia’s borders for the first time since the Cold War in such a formalized manner.

This development comes at a time when the Trump administration appears to be recalibrating U.S. commitments to European security, scaling back conventional troop presence while reinforcing nuclear deterrence. Proponents frame it as reassurance to anxious allies amid heightened tensions with Russia. However, for those committed to peace and disarmament, it represents a troubling retreat from the spirit of international arms control.

Undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear arms since 1970, faces profound challenges from this trajectory. At its heart, the NPT rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear-weapon states like the U.S. committed to pursuing good-faith negotiations toward disarmament, while non-nuclear states agreed not to acquire weapons.

Opponents of the U.S’s latest move say that by expanding nuclear sharing – where non-nuclear NATO allies train to deliver U.S. weapons in wartime – the arrangement already skirts the edges of NPT obligations. Article I prohibits nuclear states from transferring weapons or control over them to non-nuclear states, and Article II bars the latter from receiving such control. While legal interpretations have long tolerated NATO’s setup as not constituting “transfer” in peacetime, further geographic expansion and potential new hosts signal normalization of proliferation risks.

What message does this send to the world? If the preeminent nuclear power treats the NPT framework as flexible when it suits strategic interests – especially amid calls for modernization and new capabilities – why should threshold states or others adhere strictly? Nations like Iran, facing regional pressures, or others observing U.S. actions could interpret this as justification for their own pursuits, eroding the treaty’s credibility.

Disarmament advocates argue this is precisely the wrong direction. Instead of de-escalating through diplomacy, the U.S. appears to be doubling down on nuclear extended deterrence, potentially triggering a cascade: Russia modernizing its arsenal, China accelerating its buildup, and NATO allies investing heavily in dual-capable infrastructure. The recent expiration of New START without a robust successor only compounds the vacuum in arms control.

Fuelling an Arms Race and Corporate Profits

Defence industry analysts have already noted potential windfalls. Companies like Lockheed Martin (F-35 producer), BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, and others stand to gain from increased demand for dual-capable jets, maintenance, and upgrades. Stocks in the sector could surge as more nations integrate into the nuclear-sharing architecture.

Yet this profit motive clashes sharply with peace priorities. Peace advocates say that every dollar funnelled into nuclear infrastructure diverts resources from addressing climate change, poverty, or conventional conflict resolution. For the peace-oriented, the human cost is stark: heightened risks of miscalculation in a volatile Europe, where incidents like recent border incidents could spiral under the shadow of nuclear readiness.

Eastern European interest stems from legitimate security fears following Russia’s actions in Ukraine and beyond. However, true security lies not in proliferating more nuclear tripwires but in robust diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and verifiable reductions. Expanding hosting arrangements risks locking in a more dangerous status quo, making future disarmament talks harder.

A Call for Renewed Disarmament Leadership

The NPT’s review conferences have repeatedly highlighted frustrations with slow progress on disarmament. The U.S., as a depositary state, has a unique responsibility. Rather than broadening deployments, Washington could lead by example: accelerating stockpile reductions, engaging Russia and China in multilateral talks, and strengthening negative security assurances to non-nuclear states.

Civil society, including groups focused on peace and abolition, have been amplifying their voices demanding transparency and accountability. Public pressure has historically influenced nuclear policy – from the nuclear freeze movement to successful treaties like the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons), though the latter remains outside NATO’s orbit.

This proposed expansion is not inevitable. It emerges from closed-door discussions and can be challenged through parliamentary oversight in NATO capitals, diplomatic initiatives, and grassroots mobilization.

Broader Implications for Global Stability

In an era of multiple nuclear peers – Russia, China, and others – the world cannot afford a return to Cold War logics of forward basing and hair-trigger postures. Such moves heighten accident risks, cyber vulnerabilities, and the temptation for pre-emptive thinking.

For the disarmament community, this moment underscores the urgency of revitalizing the NPT. Without genuine steps toward Article VI commitments (disarmament), the treaty risks becoming a hollow shell, inviting withdrawals or parallel regimes that favour proliferation.

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